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Abstract 
Using subsidized buyer credit as a policy tool, it is shown that the general result of strategic trade policy, namely 
that, by committing itself to an export subsidy, any government can favorably change the outcome of the Cournot 
oligopoly, does not necessarily hold. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of imperfect competition into the theory of international trade, much 
attention has been focused on the discussion concerning optimal trade policy. Brander and 
Spencer (1985) first provided governments with a strong, unilateral incentive to engage in 
active trade policy. Their argument hinges on the concept of profit shifting, the idea that it is 
to the advantage of a country to capture a larger share of the production of profit-earning 
imperfectly competitive industries. The extension by Eaton and Grossman (1986) shows the 
role of oligopolistic conduct; expor t subsidies are effective when firms engage in Cournot 
competition, while export taxes are optimal when the international market is dominated by 
Bertrand behavior• 
The policy tool envisaged by Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986) 
is, in essence, a production subsidy and therefore not specific to international trade• In 
contrast, subsidizing interest on buyer credit is a widely used policy instrument directly aimed 
* Correspondence to: Jean-Marie Viaene, Department of Economics, Erasmus University H8-11, P.O. Box 
1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands. 
0165-1765/95/$09.50 © 1995 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
SSDI  0165-1765(94)00541-9 
206 G.J. Stoelinga et al. / Economics Letters 47 (1995) 205-210 
at stimulating trade (OECD, 1990; Abraham, 1990). In this paper the question is raised 
whether the tenuous conclusions of strategic trade policy, repeatedly underlined and generally 
accepted [see, e.g. Dixit (1987), Krugman (1989)] are invariant with respect o the type of 
policy tool used. 1
Subsidized buyer credits take the form of interest subsidies and arise whenever a foreign 
buyer is allowed to defer payment. An interest below the market rate is charged on a loan 
extended by an official export credit agency to a foreign importer in order to improve the 
relative position of a domestic firm. The financial resources pent on this type of subsidy are 
therefore transferred abroad. This raises the following question: are the costs of export 
subsidization by means of subsidized buyer credits fully recovered by the initiating country? 
Here, no definite answer can be given in contrast o production subsidies. 
2. A conjectural variation model 
In our model we will make the following standard assumptions. First, we will assume a 
duopoly, consisting of a domestic and a foreign company, producing imperfect substitutes for 
a third-country market. Label the firms and the corresponding countries by 1 (home) and 2 
(foreign). Second, disregarding domestic consumption in the producer countries, we will 
assume that both goods are produced for exporting purposes only. Third, a constant unit cost 
c is similar for both firms. Fourth, we will assume that every purchase made by the importing 
country is entirely bought on credit terms. Finally, only the domestic government is policy 
active. Foreign retaliation is considered in the next section. We denote third-country demand 
for home and foreign goods by x 1 and x 2 respectively, their price by Pl and P2, and the world 
lending rate by i. 
The profits//j of both firms are given by their revenue functions Rj(. ) minus the production 
costs:  
I I j  = [R j (x j ,  x t )  - cxj] j = 1, 2; l = 1, 2; l ~ j .  (1) 
Each firm entertains a conjectured quantity response of its rival, suggesting the following set 
of conjectural-variation parameters: 
vj = dx~/dxj j = 1, 2; l = 1, 2; l ~ j .  (2) 
Following Dixit's (1987) method of notation, using a comma to separate the function label 
from the differentiation subscript- for example 0R 1/Ox 2 = R1, 2 - the  first-order conditions for 
profit maximization are: 
R1,1 + OlR1, 2 = c (3) 
R2, 2 + 132R2,1 = c (4) 
Subsidized supplier credits and subsidized export insuranceare other popular instruments actually used to 
promote trade. They can, however, be interpreted as a domestic production subsidy. 
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The second-order conditions are assumed to be satisfied. Domestic surplus is defined as the 
profit of the domestic firm net of the subsidy: 
Wl=I I l - (1 - f l l ) ( l+ i )R~(X l ,Xe)  with 1/(1 + i) ~</3 ~< 1. (5) 
The parameter /31 in (5) expresses the attractive conditions that are attached to the loan. 
Without a subsidy the loan due from the importing country would amount o (1 + i)R 1. The 
creditor country, however, does not charge the world lending rate. The domain of/31 stretches 
from 1/(1 + i) to 1, since the range for government policy is bounded by two extremes; a
complete interest subsidy, /31 = 1/(1 + i), versus no subsidy at all, /31 = 1. 2 It is crucial to note 
that a lower value of/31 corresponds to a higher subsidy. Total differentiation of Eq. (5) leads 
to :  
dW~ - [R1,1 dx 1 -]- R1. 2 dx2][1 - (1 - ~31)(1 -]- i ) l  - c dx, + (1 + i)R 1 dfl,. (6) 
The unilateral introduction of the domestic subsidy on buyer credit shifts firm l's reaction 
function along firm 2's reaction curve. If we define r: = dxz/dx 1 as the slope of firm 2's 
reaction function and use the first-order conditions (3) and (4) we can rewrite Eq. (6) and 
evaluate this expression at/31 = 1, the point of no subsidy: 
0 W 1 Ox 1 
- (r 2 - vl)gl. 2 -~  + (1 + i)R 1 ~0.  (7) 
The term (r 2 -O l )  , being the difference between the slope of the foreign firm's reaction 
function and the domestic firm's conjecture about the rival's response, is crucial in determin- 
ing the sign of Eq. (7). The Bertrand model of price setting is captured by defining the 
conjectures appropriately: v~ < 0 and (r 2 - vl) > 0 (Kamien and Schwartz, 1983; Dixit, 1987, 
p. 347) and with the two firms producing substitutes, R1,: < 0. In addition, ax 1/0/31 < 0. In this 
case aW 1/0/31 > 0. Consequently, subsidization i  a Bertrand environment will always have a 
negative impact on domestic surplus, this is in accordance with Eaton and Grossman (1986). 
In the Cournot case, 01=0, r e<0.  This leaves us with two terms in Eq. (7) with 
determinate, but opposite signs: r2R1, 20Xl/O~l <0 while R 1 >0.  The conclusion therefore 
must be that the sign of OWl~O[31 cannot be unambiguously determined; subsidized buyer 
credits can either have a positive or non-positive ffect on domestic surplus. This atypical 
result deviates from the unambiguous findings of both Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton 
and Grossman (1986), who agree that an export subsidy benefits the home country. To 
understand the difference in results, note that a production subsidy directly reduces the 
domestic firm's marginal cost, thus cancelling on the national aggregate, while a subsidized 
interest on buyer credit stimulates third-country demand for the domestic firm's product and 
comes as a cost to the active country as a whole. 
2 No discount rate is applied in (5) as it would blur the comparison with received theory. Proper discounting by 
the government would, however, require more information about the timing of costs and profits in the interval. 
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3. Sensitivity analysis with linear examples 
To illustrate further the result found above under Cournot-Nash competition, consider the 
following set of third-country demand equations for domestic and foreign goods: 
x, = 1 -/31(1 + i )p  I + a(1 + i )p  2 (8) 
x 2 = 1 - (1 + i )p  2 + a/31(1 + i )p  I (9) 
where ot (with values 0< a < 1) measures the substitutability between goods 1 and 2 in 
third-country consumption. The subsidy /31 works directly on the price of good 1 as it is 
perceived by the third-country importer. 
After solving for Pl and P2 from (8) and (9), the Cournot-Nash equilibrium solution 
(denoted by superscript n) and the following comparative statics derivatives are readily 
obtained: 
n 
Ox 1 2 Ox 2 -2c ( l+ i ) (1 -a  2) 
0/31 a 0/31 (4 - a 2) 
<0 (10) 
0/31 - (2 + a)/3~ ~ + ~ < 0 (11) 
Op 2 ca  
m 
0/31 (4 - a a) 
>0 (12) 
The main observation from these results is that the absolute values of (11) to (12) are 
increasing in the marginal cost c. This is important for the interpretation of Fig. 1. 
The relationship between the rate of subsidization and the domestic surplus is given by (5) 
with 111 = (Px  - c)x"~. Taking the derivative of this expression with respect o/31" 
OW 1 ~ Ox  n . . . .  . n n 1 , ,, °Pa l  Oxl 
a/31 - [1 - (1 - /31) (1  +i)]  [p '~-~7*x l~- f f [ ] - c -~+(a  +~)p lx l .  (13) 
Setting OW110/31 = 0, using (10) and (11), we obtain the optimal subsidy/3~ as a function of 
the parameters of the model, a, c and i. The optimal subsidy /3~ must be such that the 
increase in the firm's profit as a result of a marginal increase in subsidy is just offset by the 
resources loss to the government. The question is whether/3~ falls within or outside the closed 
interval [1/(1 + i), 1]. A value of/3~ > 1 would imply a capital tax as optimal policy whereas 
/3~' < 1/(1 + i) would imply a price subsidy larger than the complete interest subsidy. 
Suppose that the world lending rate is 7% (i = 0.07). Because data on a and c are poor and 
subject o errors, sensitivity analysis over a wide range of these two parameters i  carried out. 
The results are reproduced in Fig. 1. Here, /3~ is drawn as a continuous function of a for five 
values of c ranging from 0.5 to 2.5. Unlike the existing literature, the optimal policy 
prescribed by Fig. 1 is not uniform; it depends upon the parameter constellations (c, a). 
Whatever c, from the lower end of the range of a (or < 0.53), no subsidized buyer credit is 
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Fig. 1. Optimal interest subsidy i l l .  
optimal. 3 Charging a higher than world interest rate would even be justified. For the upper 
end of the range of a -h igh  cross-price f fects-  a subsidized buyer credit becomes justified 
for sufficiently high marginal costs (c > 0.794). For c > 1.255, some combinations of o~ and c 
call for a complete subsidized buyer credit. A price subsidy beyond the interest subsidy would 
also be justified. 
It is possible to elaborate considerably on our model with foreign retaliation. In a two-stage 
export subsidy game, each country would chose, after the market stage, its export subsidy 
given the export subsidy of the other country so that 0W//0/3 i = 0 (i = 1, 2). 4 We can show by 
simulations that, for certain parameter values (e.g. i = 0.07, a = 0.7), the equilibrium reaction 
functions in subsidies are upward sloping when c < 1.45, vertical and horizontal ines when 
c = 1.45, and downward sloping when c > 1.45. 
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